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1 
 
In the ashen smoke of airliners crashing, glass shattering, and steel 
evaporating, visions of internationalism and safety become 
difficult to see.  Bright images of progress and globalism yield to 
clouds of terror and trouble.  Radical Muslims have declared war 
on America:  this “fact,” the pictures of Muslims cheering Osama 
Bin Laden, and the celebratory gestures of Iraqi leader Saddam 
Hussein crowded out images of mourning Arabs.  Photographs of 
Yassir Arafat giving blood to help the New York City victims got 
little play.  After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Samuel Huntington’s 
oft-challenged claim of an inevitable Clash of Civilizations (1996) 
between a Muslim East and a Christian West swung back into 
fashion. 
 
 
2 
 
In pronouncing this rupture between East and West, media 
commentators often name the Iranian Revolution as the first full-
blown demonstration of Islamist radicalism.  Revolutionary 
discourse from the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1930s and from 
activist Sayyid Qutb in Egypt predated the Iran Revolution.  Yet 
events in Iran involved a prophetic discourse that discounted Arab 
leaders as infidels and indicted Western society as corrupt.  When 
Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda echoed these charges, the 
Ayatollah Khomeini, the Iranian Revolution, and the seizure of 
American hostages emerged as the first figures of Islamic unrest 
recognized by most Americans.  Together these form much of the 
background that popular media cite for the Attack on America. 
 
 
3 
 
The rhetorical fount of Islamist ideology in Iran was the Ayatollah 
Khomeini.  Through Friday sermons and occasional writings, he 
discredited the U.S.-imposed monarchy of the Shah as 
illegitimate.  Widely read in revolutionary Iran, his treatise on 
Islamic Government ( Velayat-e Faqih) has become the 
foundation for the post-revolutionary society.  Rose portrays 
Khomeini as the one figure responsible for “the restructuring of 
the personal and social consciousness of Muslims into an 
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ideologically Islamic identity” (1983, p. 167). 
 
4 
 
Khomeini’s rhetoric attracted those who rebelled not only against 
the Shah but also against the westernization of Iran.  The Shah’s 
rapid modernization inundated Iranians with new values, resulting 
in the loss of iraniyat:  the uniquely Iranian identity.  Khomeini’s 
Islamist identity became the replacement.  Many alternatives such 
as Tudeh, the Marxist party, portrayed themselves as non-Islamic, 
using discourses and symbols exogenous to Iran.  Khomeini 
claimed a distinctively Iranian inspiration in Shi’ite Islam.  Most 
surviving Islamic groups became part of Khomeini’s movement, 
and it channeled hostility to the Shah toward Shi’ite Islam and 
Khomeini as the supreme Iranian leader. 
 
 
5 
 
Current instability in Iran and Iraq, as well as the decisive role of 
the Iranian Revolution in popular constructions of radical Islam, 
should return us to this pivotal moment to consider its cultural, 
political, and religious exigencies along with the ideology that 
responds to them.  Yet Khomeini’s discourse has attracted little 
analysis in the area of rhetoric.  Especially its grounds in Islamic 
jurisprudence deserve attention.1  These are key aspects of his 
discourse and his conception of what constitutes a true Muslim.  
To show this, the essay analyzes the political identity formulated 
during Iran’s revolution in relation to the anti-imperial discourse 
of the Ayatollah that made opposition to the Shah into a cause of 
Islam. 
 
 
 
 
The Rhetorical Use of Fard to Foster 
a Discourse of Ritualistic Obligation  
 
6 
 
Shi’ite Islam teaches a variety of religious practices as being 
mandatory for its followers.  These include the seven major 
obligations:  prayer, fasting, the paying of alms, a religious tax, the 
pilgrimage to Mecca, religious wars or striving ( jihad), while 
“enjoining the good and forbidding the evil” ( al-amr bi’l-ma‘ruf 
wa’l-nahy an’l-munkar) (‘Ali 1990).  Khomeini drew on the notion 
of obligation ( fard) inherent within Shi’ite Islam.  Both jihad and 
“enjoining the good and forbidding the evil” are fard kifaya:  
obligations that can be fulfilled by a designated group to satisfy 
their requirement of the community (Dabashi 1993).  Deciding 
who should fulfill these requirements falls on the chief religious 
figure in the community, the marja’-e taqlid:  the “source of 
exemplary conduct.”  As the supreme marja-’e taqlid, Khomeini 
was entrusted with the right to collect the religious tax, to order a 
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defensive jihad, and to require his followers to “enjoin the good 
and forbid evil.” 
 
7 
 
The Shi’ite marja’-e taqlid also has the power to transform a fard 
kifaya (collective duty) into a fard ‘ayn (individual duty), obliging 
each person in the community to act.  As the highest ranking 
religious leader, Khomeini invoked these obligations.  They 
became an early and pivotal part of  his revolutionary discourse.  
In Velayat-e Faqih, for example, he argued that “enjoining the 
good and forbidding the evil” is a responsibility for the whole 
Islamic community: 
 
 
8 
 
The Lord of the Martyrs (upon whom be peace) speaks of 
“summoning men to Islam while at the same time remedying 
oppression and opposing the oppressors;” it is for the sake of these 
great aims that enjoining the good and forbidding the evil has been 
made a duty. . . .  “Enjoining the good and forbidding the evil” is 
most imperative in such cases [where the government opposes 
Islam]. 
 
 
9 
 
Now let me ask you:  were the subjects mentioned by the Lord of 
the Martyrs in his sermon addressed only to the companions who 
were gathered around him listening to his words?  Does not the 
phrase “O people, take heed” address us too?  Are we not included 
in “people?” (1981, pp. 118-119). 
 
 
10 
 
Before Khomeini could transform performance of these religious 
practices into a revolutionary call for the entire nation, he needed 
to define what constitutes good and evil in a way compelling to a 
massive audience, and he needed to describe the evil forces in a 
manner that met doctrinal definitions inherent within jihad.  
Hence he created a fard ’ayn to impel Iranians to oppose the 
Shah.  To define himself as good and the Shah as evil, Khomeini 
drew on symbolic and mythic dimensions of Shi’a Islam.  He 
shaped these to oblige Iranians to enact a jihad against the Shah, 
and he strengthened their revolutionary spirit through the 
rhetorical use of ritualization. 
 
 
 
 Ideological and Historical Context  
 
11 
 
The Shah’s rule was marked by rapid modernization coupled with 
a decided lean toward Western views and customs.  The previously 
deposed Shah was indebted to the West after a 1953 coup, 
sponsored by the CIA, had returned him to power.  The coup 
displaced a liberal-democratic movement headed by Mohammed 
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Mosaddeq (Green 1982).  In 1964, the Shah symbolically 
demonstrated the heavy influence of the West by extending 
diplomatic immunity to all Americans living in Iran.  This touched 
off the first conflict between Khomeini and the Shah, resulting in 
the Ayatollah’s long exile. 
 
12 
 
As Khomeini shifted his homeland from Turkey to Iraq, the Shah 
continued with reforms, initiating what he labeled as the “White 
Revolution.”  During the early 1970s, the Shah strove to 
incorporate the Ullama (religious clergy) into the machinery of the 
governing body, pressuring clerics to become members of his 
“Religious Corps.”  At the same time, he tried to shift the nation’s 
sense of identity toward its heritage from ancient Persia, 
diminishing the emphasis on Islam as a source of identification. 
The seventies brought with them other significant changes.  Petro 
dollars accelerated the Westernization of the economy (Ramazani 
1982).  Yet the poor planning of the White Revolution caused 
impoverishment of the peasantry, resulting in urbanization, slums, 
and unemployment. 
 
 
13 
 
The Shah responded to these tumultuous transformations by 
strengthening the power of his military forces, installing an 
autocratic form of one-party rule, and increasing the oppressive 
force of  SAVAK, his secret police (Khosrow 1982).  Even before 
revolutionary protests began in the late seventies,  the Pahlavi 
regime had estranged itself from the population.  The regime was 
staunchly associated with Western values, failed economic policies, 
and violations of human and political rights. 
 
 
14 
 
Khomeini stood in clear contrast to the modernist, anti-Islamic 
leadership style of the Shah.  He spoke to the nation from Iraq and 
France, delivering the weekly Khutbah or Friday sermon which 
would later be replayed in mosques throughout Iran (Ram 1994).  
The Khutbah is delivered by individuals of religious note and 
constitutes an obligatory service for Muslims (‘Ali 1990).  Through 
these speeches and his written essays, the Ayatollah defined 
himself not only as a representative of the religious establishment 
but also as the embodiment of an anti-Western, anti-imperialist 
ideology. 
 
 
15 
 
Khomeini’s anti-imperialism is evident in Velayat-e Faqih:  “In 
order to attain the unity and freedom of the Muslim peoples, we 
must overthrow the oppressive governments installed by the 
imperialists and bring into existence an Islamic government of 
justice that will be in the service of the people” (1981, p. 49).  As 
 
Susan Zickmund 26 Poroi, 2, 2, November, 2003 
Dabashi observes, “Opposing the Iranian monarchy is negating 
‘The West.’  Negating ‘The West’ is reclaiming the political cum 
theological veracity of Islam:  the source of all Muslim identity” 
(1993, p. 509).  As the supreme religious figure, Khomeini 
embodied the indigenous culture of the nation.  At issue was not 
only an attack on the West, on what Dabashi labels the Islamic 
version of “‘Other’-centricism,” but the establishment of an Iranian 
form of “‘Self’-consciousness” (1993, p. 510).  Khomeini’s focus on 
native customs strengthened the ideal of iraniyat, of what is 
uniquely Iranian (Lawrence 1990, p. 224).  Thus Khomeini’s 
discourse stood for something more than pan-Islamism or anti-
modernization; it stood as anti-Western ideology with the goal of 
attaining cultural and religious authenticity. 
 
 
 
Symbolism and Myth: 
Evoking a Conception of Good and Evil  
 
16 
 
Khomeini’s discourse drew on a powerful repository:  the 
recollection of Islamic myths and symbols.  Skocpol contends in 
this connection that “Shi’a Islam arguably has especially salient 
symbolic resources to justify resistance against unjust authority” 
(1982, p. 273).  Dabashi avers that “the revolutionary function of 
the ‘Islamic Ideology’ received its impetus as well as its driving 
force from dormant common mythologies deeply rooted in the 
Iranian collective memory” (1993, p. 504).  Even the secularized 
elements in Iran ― such as the middle and upper classes ― 
responded to the religious symbolism fostered by Khomeini and 
the Ullama.  Beeman notes that non-believers reacted to 
Khomeini’s appeals, because “religious doctrine often serves as a 
concretization of these core symbols, both making statements 
about the truth of the conceptual world in which society exists, and 
prescribing for society’s members what they should and should not 
do” (1983, p. 193).  With powerful symbolic associations, 
Khomeini’s discourse redefined modern Iranian society by tapping 
old religious themes.  It tied religious and historical symbols for 
good and evil to contemporary figures. 
 
 
17 
 
Khomeini’s discourse drew on a Manichean conception of religion.  
The reality he depicted in speeches fused worldly powers in politics 
with the fundamental forces of good and evil.  Iranian experience 
of such dualism originates in pre-Islamic times.  Zoroastrian 
religion dominated the region, then called Persia.  It dichotomized 
good and evil as powerful opposing forces.  Evil is represented by 
the exterior world, batin; while good is the interior core, zahir.  
Zoroastrian dualism eventually was assimilated into the 
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monotheism of Islam, which substituted God (Allah) for “good” 
and the devil (Shaitan) for “evil.”  Shaitan is known as the Great 
Satan, the great tempter, stemming from his role in the fall of 
Adam.  Because Islam associates the devil with the exterior of the 
body or the nation, this figure of Satan was ripe for exploitation in 
a discourse of anti-Imperialism (Bateson 1977, pp. 269-270). 
 
18 
 
The batin, or exterior, has strong negative implications rooted in 
the nation’s past.  Iranian history reveals a persistent pattern of 
foreign subjugation.  From the classical period through the British 
and Russian occupations of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
to recent politics, Iran has been overwhelmed by a succession of 
worldly powers, each emanating from the batin.  The repeated 
usurpations have fed Iranian fears of the exterior, which threatens 
the zahir, the inside world of the Iranian nation. 
 
 
19 
 
Khomeini’s discourse depended on this dualism.  He emphasized 
dual forces of good and evil, holy and satanic, foreign and 
indigenous influences.  Khomeini depicted the Shah in devil 
terms.  Constructing an image for the Shah with great saliency in 
Iran, Khomeini portrayed him as non-Muslim.  Critical to 
subverting his symbolic power as King was exclusion of the Shah 
from all sacred images of Islam.  Khomeini associated him instead 
with infidelity and evil.  This construction linked the Shah to the 
forces of batin.  Khomeini featured anti-Islamic changes that the 
Shah had imposed on the country.  He associated the Shah’s White 
Revolution to modernize Iran with ancient Persia (Heisey 1983, p. 
160).  Comparing the Shah to an evil, pre-Islamic king, Khomeini 
proclaimed, “The religious leaders will hoist the banner of Islam to 
exact vengeance on this Zuhhak of the age, and the nation of 
Islam, with their hearts in unison and obeying the life-giving 
teachings of the Qur’an, will expunge every trace of this anti-
Islamic regime that wishes to revive Zoroastrianism” (1981, p. 
230). 
 
 
20 
 
The Shah aided this interpretation, demonstrating a desire to 
return to the Persian culture that preceded the influence of Islam.  
His self-coronation ceremony and a 2,500-year anniversary 
celebration of the Iranian monarchy adopted pre-Islamic themes.  
He switched from the Islamic calendar to the one used by a pre-
Islamic ruler, Cyrus the Great.  Khomeini seized on this act as a 
sign of the Shah’s determination to eradicate Islam.  The Shah “is 
against the Islamic calendar.  To be against the Islamic calendar is 
to be against Islam itself; in fact the worst thing that this man has 
done during his reign is to change the calendar.  Changing the 
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calendar is even worse than the massacres; it is an affront to the 
Most Noble Messenger himself (peace and blessings be upon him)” 
(1981, pp. 217-218). 
 
21 
 
Khomeini also relied on specific personas that mobilized the 
audience sense of Iranian history and religion.  He invested the 
political language of Iranian revolution with three compelling 
characters:  Yazid, Shaitan, and the holy Imam.  These figures 
proved especially effective. 
 
 
22 
 
The Shah became Yazid, a figure from Islamic faith.  Historically 
Islam began with Mohammed, whose authority was passed to Abu 
Bakr and eventually to the Prophet’s son-in-law, Ali.  Ali was soon 
assassinated; and leadership was to pass to Ali’s son, Hasan.  In 
the general confusion, however, a military commander named 
Yazid came to power.  Husain, Hasan’s younger brother, refused to 
pay allegiance to Yazid, whom he saw as evil.  Husain fled with his 
followers into the desert (Armajani 1979, pp. 17-18).  Yazid 
pursued the group and executed them brutally.  In the Shi’ite 
religion, Husain is the greatest political hero, and Yazid the most 
heinous of all rulers.  Yazid becomes the despicable evil among 
Iranians, one that must be destroyed.  Sometimes Khomeini 
directly called the Shah “Yazid.”  On other occasions, he evoked the 
persona by comparison.  In the Khutbah, “In Commemoration of 
the First Martyrs of the Revolution,” Khomeini declared that “The 
Messenger of God (peace and blessings be upon him) was indeed a 
true Shadow of God; but is this vile Shah a shadow of God?  Yes, a 
few thoughtless people among us say so, but that would mean that 
Yazid was also a ‘holder of authority’ and anyone who rebelled 
against him deserved to be killed!” (1981, p. 226). 
 
 
23 
 
Khomeini constructed the United States as the Shaitan, the Great 
Satan, the evil enemy that threatens Iran from outside.  For 
Iranians, the Great Satan is the lascivious and tempting devil, a 
corrupting force that becomes the ultimate menace to Islam 
(Beeman 1983).  Like radical Islamists before and since, Khomeini 
condemned the United States as a secular wasteland where wanton 
sexuality and consumer goods lure people into forgetting genuine 
goodness.  Of course, he capitalized on the mythic relationship 
between Yazid and the Great Satan.  Yazid was a pawn of Shaitan; 
thus the Shah, by analogy, was as a pawn of the Great Satan of 
America.  Khomeini emphasized the Shah’s addictive and 
poisonous service to the West by talking of Gharbzadegi or 
“Westoxication” (Rose 1983, p. 182). 
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In contrast, the Ullama (the Iranian clergy) and various 
revolutionaries treated Khomeini as indigenous ( iraniyat) and 
hallowed, centering him within the good zahir (interior).  This was 
evident in posters disseminated throughout Iran in praise of the 
Ayatollah.  One illuminated Khomeini with a divine aura and said, 
“When the devil goes, the angel arrives” (Merriam 1981, p. 396)  In 
opposition to the evil Shah and the satanic Americans, Khomeini 
became the Imam:  the religious epitome of goodness, wisdom, 
and instruction.  As a title, “Imam” marks the respect of the 
religious community, much as “reverend,” “rabbi,” or “father” does 
in other religions.  Yet elements of Khomeini’s persona and 
discourse also linked the title to a more transcendent image.  
Through his choice of theological stories and his charismatic, 
mystical presentation of them, Khomeini adhered closely to a 
culturally established figure of religious authority larger by far 
than a local priest or minister. 
 
 
25 
 
The mythic dimensions of the Imam as a figure of authority reach 
deep into Shi’ite history.  The Shi’ite sect of Islam is often called 
the “twelver” sect, because it believes in the evolution of twelve 
different Imams.  Ali acquired the title as the first Imam, after the 
death of the Prophet Mohammed and his early successors.  Each 
Imam is thought to personify a direct link between God and man.  
Only the Imam could rightfully rule the people and formulate 
Islamic law, functioning as liaison between this world and the one 
beyond.  Siddiqui defines the power, sacred and secular, behind 
the idiomatic term:  “Whatever version of Shi’ism one looks at, at 
whatever point it may have expressed itself in Islamic history, the 
crucial point has been the doctrine of the Imamate, the figure of 
the Imam, who is not merely the successor of the Prophet (on 
whom be peace) in a legislative, administrative and even military 
capacity, but is also in some sense an extension of the spiritual 
dimensions of the prophetic mission” (1980, p. 32). 
 
 
26 
 
Early in Shi’ite history, the twelfth Imam went into “occultation,” 
disappearing from the sight of his followers.  Shi’ites believe that 
he will reemerge at a future date to lead the faithful followers into 
the golden age, where the world will be tranquil and Islamic.  
Within the Shi’ite tradition, only the Imam has authority to rule 
the community.  After the original occultation, however, secular 
rulers arose and created what the faithful viewed as legitimate 
political power.  In Velayat-e Faqih, Khomeini successfully 
radicalized this tradition by denying authority to all secular powers 
and designating members of the religious community instead as 
the legitimate successors to the earlier Imam:  “Today, the fuqaha 
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[jurists, plural of faqih] of Islam are proofs to the people.  Just as 
the Most Noble Messenger (upon whom be peace and blessings) 
was the proof of God . . . so, too, the fuqaha are the proof of the 
Imam (upon whom be peace) to the people.  All the affairs of the 
Muslims have been entrusted to them.  God will advance a proof 
and argument against anyone who disobeys them in anything 
concerning government, the conduct of Muslim affairs, or the 
gathering and expenditure of public funds” (1981, p. 87).  In this 
rendition of the Imam, Khomeini made secular authority 
illegitimate and legitimated the fuqaha ― the religious clerics 
trained in Islamic jurisprudence ― as authoritative successors to 
the hidden Imam.  As the supreme religious leader , the marja‘-e 
talqid, Khomeini himself became the ultimate successor to the 
hidden Imam:  the only legitimate holder of authority. 
 
27 
 
During the revolution, Khomeini typically was identified by the 
religious title of Imam.2   Khomeini never insinuated that he was 
the actual Imam, returned from occultation; theological 
constraints would have rendered such a claim blasphemous.  Yet 
as Merriam notes, “while Khomeini has made no claims that he is 
god, his extraordinary influence on millions of Iranian Shi’ites is 
inevitably linked to their belief in and expectation of the Holy 
Imam” (1981, p. 398).  Fischer (1980, p. 177) describes a series of 
legends concerning Khomeini that began during the revolution, 
legends that prophesied his eventual return from exile to his native 
land.  These supported the belief that he was the twelfth Imam, 
creating a mythic figure attractive to the Iranian people. 
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Max Weber (1968) long ago showed how leaders with charismatic 
qualities are often treated as if endowed with superhuman powers.  
Reinhard Bendix stresses the importance of circumstances:  
charismatic leaders frequently arise in times of crisis, when people 
“surrender themselves to a heroic figure” (1977, p. 300).  
Dimensions of Khomeini’s ethos ― his emphasis on mystical 
Islam, his ascetic behavior, even his physical distance from the 
nation as his words spread disembodied throughout the land ― 
helped foster a comparison to the holy hidden Imam.  Khomeini’s 
persona, coupled with his unyielding adherence to religious 
principles, meshed with the culturally accepted image of a 
religious authority.  All these theological and charismatic factors 
associated him with the omnipotent persona of the hidden Imam. 
 
 
29 
 
This role of the Imam enabled Khomeini to invoke the religious 
token of the “golden age.”  In Islamic teachings, the golden age is 
the transcendent epoch that occurs after the hidden Imam returns  
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to earth.   Historically the golden age has been viewed as a time 
when the world would be peaceful, prosperous, and wholly 
Islamized.  Again Khomeini fostered this association through 
theoretical writings.  He argued in Velayat-e Faqih that only 
through a truly Islamic government could peace and tranquility 
come to earth.  In ridding Iran of the Shah, the evil and illegitimate 
holder of authority, the religious fuqaha ― as the defenders of true 
justice ― would be able to spread justice and happiness 
throughout the land.  “The two qualities of knowledge of the 
[Islamic] law and justice are present in countless fuqaha of the 
present age.  If they would come together, they could establish a 
government of universal justice in the world” (1981, p. 62). 
 
30 
 
  For a country filled with broken, unhappy people, this vision 
provided strength and hope.  If the inhabitants could be persuaded 
that Khomeini was the hidden Imam, they might believe that 
Khomeini could usher in a halcyonic golden age.  That image, 
Halliday (1984, p. 201) maintains, infused supporters with energy, 
convincing them that their struggle was not futile and that 
revolutionary change could bring a better day. 
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The three personas, related figures, and doctrinal definitions in 
Khomeini’s discourse seemed to persuade many Iranians that the 
Shah was more than a political oppressor:  instead he was an evil 
influence that could lead to the downfall of Islam in Iran and on 
earth.  Summoning the sense of duty for al-amr bi’l-ma‘ruf 
wa’lnahy an’-l-munkar (“enjoining the good and forbidding the 
evil”), Khomeini established an exigency for action. 
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The pervasive power of Khomeini’s discourse is apparent in an 
anecdote told by Jerrold Green.  In a government copy center, 
Green attempted to reprint a revolutionary pamphlet.  At first the 
man behind the desk, an employee of the Shah, refused.  But later 
the man criticized the poor quality of the copy and produced 
another from a huge pile on his machine.  Green viewed this 
incident as indicative of the allure of Khomeini’s appeal.  The copy 
machine employee, “in his own fashion, was a revolutionary.  He 
was never recruited into a formal oppositional structure but rather 
responded to stimuli rampant in the Iran of 1978-79.  He had two 
choices open to him, support for the Shah or for Khomeini.  He 
chose the latter, as did most Iranians, giving into vague though 
irresistible instincts by supporting what most Iranians were led to 
believe was good over evil” (1984, p. 162). 
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Ritualistic Obligation: 
Fard and Khomeini’s Call for Jihad  
 
33 
 
The concept of jihad is an important component of Islamic 
religious faith, one frequently misconstrued in the West.  The term 
has two main meanings.  First, and most commonly, it refers to a 
form of striving exerted by each Muslim for the betterment of 
Islam.3  Second, jihad can mean a “military action with the object 
of the expansion of Islam and, if need be, of its defense,” although 
a religious leader may still encourage a more peaceful enactment 
of jihad (“Djihad” 1960, p. 538).  The Qur’an says that jihad is “‘an 
act of pure devotion’; it is ‘one of the gates to Paradise;’ rich 
heavenly rewards are guaranteed for those who devote themselves 
to it” (p. 539).  Jihad as a military action is a collective duty ( fard 
kifaya) and is obligatory for the individuals who reside nearest to 
the domain of need.  Yet the sovereign authority may transform 
jihad from a fard kifaya into a fard ’ayn, an individual obligation 
(p. 539).  Its ability to impose individual obligations made jihad a 
critical part of Khomeini’s rhetoric for Iranian revolution. 
 
 
34 
 
Khomeini constructed jihad into a rhetorical strategy by conveying 
a two-part message:  First, the Shah is an infidel, making him a 
target for impending jihad.  And second, self-sacrifice and 
martyrdom are inevitable components of the impending jihad. 
 
 
35 
 
In calling for jihad against the Shah, Khomeini faced an daunting 
doctrinal barrier in Islam.  Traditionally jihad was used against 
only the dal al-harb:  the external infidels who threatened the 
security of the borders of Islamic countries and, by extension, the 
Islamic faith.  This focus did not fit Khomeini’s cause.  The Shah, 
as a member of the long-standing Pahlavi regime, could not be 
portrayed as an external enemy who endangered the autonomy of 
Iran.  Recognizing this, Khomeini shifted the figure to emphasize 
that the overarching rational for jihad is not to protect nations qua 
nations but rather the Islamic faith.  In “ Muharram:  The 
Triumph of Blood over the Sword,” a speech delivered in 
November of 1978, Khomeini decreed that the Shah “threatens the 
higher interests of the Muslims and the dictates of Islam with 
imminent destruction for the sake of his own satanic rule and his 
parasitic masters” (1981, p. 242).  Consistent with figuring the 
Shah as Yazid, Khomeini’s message was that threats to Islam can 
originate from inside as well as outside an Islamic nation.  Jihad 
against internal forces that contravene the doctrines of Allah can 
be every bit as justified as holy war against external aggressors. 
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36 
 
Khomeini also called for martyrs to give their lives in jihad against 
the Shah.  During his reign, the Shah had often demonstrated a 
willingness to use any means necessary to quell protest ― 
including heavily-armed troops, tanks, and deadly attacks with 
aircraft.  For the jihad against the Pahlavi regime to succeed, 
Khomeini needed to strengthen the resolve of revolutionaries to 
the point where they would be willing to die for their cause if 
needed.  Overwhelming logistical superiority of the Shah’s army 
made the carnage of thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands, 
seem inevitable.  How could Khomeini summon the anti-Shah 
forces to such a confrontation?  His glorified image of martyrdom 
likened the struggle of Iranian masses to the earlier sacrifices of 
Islamic martyrs:  “Your blood is being shed for the same cause as 
the blood of the prophets and the Imams and the righteous. You 
will join them and you have no cause to grieve therefore, but every 
reason for joy” (1981, p. 240).  Khomeini emphasized that 
revolutionary acts would be rewarded in a glorious spiritual 
afterlife for all who stood true to Islam.  This also minimized the 
value of earthly lives lost.  No price, including death, would be too 
great to pay (Ayoub 1978, p. 46). 
 
 
37 
 
The trust engendered by Khomeini’s rhetoric of martyrdom 
became visible in the actions of Iranians, with thousands 
martyring themselves.  One woman expressed her interpretation of 
the revolutionary rhetoric:  “Now the people are aware of the 
whole meaning of religion. . . .  This year we know that his message 
is ― death.  If you can kill, kill.  If you can’t, die in the attempt.  
Either kill or get killed, but like Husain [the martyred prophet] 
fight against repression and tyranny” (Hegland 1983, pp. 229-
230).  Many cases of similar testimony suggest that Khomeini’s 
discourse resonated throughout the nation to alter conceptions of 
sacrifice and martyrdom.  When the religious leaders finally called 
for the armed struggle, many Iranians responded to undo the 
Shah. 
 
 
 
 The Husain Ritual  
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Khomeini’s messages of revolution culminated in a holy Islamic 
ritual.  Ritual can have great power to commit people to causes or 
values.  Langer explained that a ritual is “primarily an articulation 
of feelings.  The ultimate product of such articulation is not a 
simple emotion, but a complex, permanent attitude . . . [that] 
yields a strong sense of tribal or congregational unity, of rightness 
and security” (1957, p. 153).  According to Hegland (1983, p. 235), 
the Husain ritual was the single most decisive factor in destroying 
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the spirit of the Shah’s army, resulting in the government’s 
demise.  In a war of numbers and will power, this ritual generated 
marches and demonstrations that involved millions of people, 
inducing the collapse of the Pahlavi dynasty. 
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The ritual originated in Husain’s martyrdom at the hand of Yazid’s 
army in a desert place called Karbala.  Throughout each year, the 
Shi’ite calendar relates various stories tied to Karbala, with Ashura 
― the day of Husain’s death ― marking the climax.  The ritual 
involves smiting the breast, chanting, and wailing (Pelly 1879); and 
the revolutionary performance altered little.  Yet its meaning too 
was shaped by religious dissenters from the regime, especially by 
the Ayatollah, to serve the revolution.  Hegland observes that “The 
success of the revolution followed a transformation in the 
understanding of the central message of Shi’i Islam among the 
Iranian masses.  Leaders of the revolution from religious, 
educational, and bazaari groups were successful in their advocacy 
of revolution because they presented an ideology appealing to large 
numbers of both Shi’i Muslims and non-Shi’is” (1983, p. 219).  She 
concludes that the Husain persona shifted from “Husain as 
Intercessor,” with people praying to him for favors and a path to 
paradise, to “Husain as Example,” with people treating him as a 
role model for protest against the tyranny of an evil government 
(pp. 225-230). 
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This shift proved crucial in mobilizing Iranian masses.  It 
happened in three steps.  The first was furnished by revolutionary 
leaders such as Dr. Ali Shari’ati, an Islamic scholar who preached 
resistance to unjust authority (Dabashi 1993, p. 102).  Many of 
these leaders had died or left the country, indeed Shari’ati perished 
two years before the revolution. yet their words provided a basis 
for the formation of dissent.  The second step came from 
Khomeini.  As the most widely recognized resistance leader, he 
promulgated revolutionary arguments that relied at times on the 
newly reconstructed persona of Husain.  Third, the Ullama 
disseminated these revolutionary messages, promoting the new 
meaning of the Husain ritual throughout the nation.  By the time 
the revolution reached its climax, vast numbers of Iranians shared 
the reconstructed sense of the Husain ritual. 
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As revered interpreters of Islam, religious leaders facilitated 
revision of what they called  the formerly “erroneous” conception 
of the Husain ritual.  Yet the public may have been ready in any 
event for a new perspective on the ritual that could increase their 
emotional commitment to the revolution.  The Khomeini discourse 
 
Susan Zickmund 35 Poroi, 2, 2, November, 2003 
of jihad and martyrdom transubstantiated the ritual into a vehicle 
for people to express their despair and enact a willingness to die 
for the destruction of the evil that they felt to pervade their 
country.  Hegland cites a Persian phrase that exemplifies this 
feeling:  az khod gozashteh refers to a person’s willingness to 
sacrifice life itself in order to end an intolerable circumstance.  As 
an Iranian woman told Hegland, “When I no longer care about my 
own life, when I’ve given up on my own life, I don’t need you any 
more.  . . . If I know I’m going to die, I will shoot at the person who 
is making me unhappy.  It doesn’t matter if he hits me back, 
because I am going to die anyway” (1983, p. 233). 
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Khomeini was able to address these feelings and infuse individuals 
with hope, even if it could be actualized only through death, 
through giving the expression of hostility a ritualized form.  
Muharram is the night before Ashura, the day of Husain’s death.  
In his Friday Khutbah sermon on “ Muharram:  The Triumph of 
Blood Over the Sword,” Khomeini instructed people to rebel:  
“There is no need to remind you that mourning assemblies must 
be fully independent, and not dependent on permission by the 
police or that subversive body called the security organization.  
Dear people, organize your gatherings . . . in public squares, in 
thoroughfares and streets, and proclaim the sufferings endured by 
Islam and the Muslims and the treacherous acts of the Shah’s 
regime” (1981, p. 244).  Given November 23, 1978, this speech 
marked a critical moment in the history of the revolution.  Before 
the time of Muharram, Khomeini had not issued a specific call for 
people to revolt against the government.  Now he was linking the 
performance of the Husain ritual, imbued with new meaning, to a 
final confrontation with the forces of the Shah.  Khomeini had 
claimed the holiest day of the Islamic calendar for rousing people 
to reject the Shah. 
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From a rhetorical perspective, the use of this traditional religious 
ritual is striking.  Bennett argues that the need for myth and ritual 
has deep roots as a “primary process [where] thinking is 
characterized by projection, fantasy, the incorporation of 
nonverbal imagery, a high emotional content . . . and the 
generation of multiple levels of meaning” (1983, p. 43).  Rituals 
bind people through shared symbols that create common purpose.  
The group dynamic can carry people farther than any individual 
would have gone.  Analyzing the Husain ritual, Kertzer says that 
“the most dramatic role of ritual in the political process is that of 
inspiring masses of people to take some action.  . . . Ritual provides 
the symbolism which makes action legitimate, while providing the 
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social condition which makes taking action not only possible but 
often compelling and sometimes unreflective” (1983, p. 64).  Ritual 
acts help participants experience “truths” that obviate the need for 
independent cognition by the individuals who perform them. 
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Rituals are consummatory devices that can provide in themselves 
the basis for action (Aronoff 1983, p. 9).  In Iran, this non-
discursive communication sidestepped many possible questions 
and uncertainties, enabling Khomeini to mobilize people 
successfully against the Shah.  The seemingly sudden upheaval 
shocked the Shah’s troops and overwhelmed his government.  
Kertzer concurs that the Husain ritual was a key to the Iranian 
revolution:  “the fall of the Shah was directly precipitated by the 
performance of a mass ritual held as part of the commemoration of 
the anniversary of Hussein’s [sic] martyrdom” (1983, p. 65). 
 
 
 
 The Rhetoric of Obligation and Ideology  
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Rather than rely on irrationalism and fanaticism, as critics of 
Islam maintain, Khomeini’s discourse features theological 
obligation supported by the use of symbols, myths, and religious 
personas; the requirement of jihad redirected to target internal 
evils; and the rhetorical transmutation of an important Islamic 
ritual.  These moves reflect several considerations specific to Iran 
at the time.  (1) The oppressive character of the Shah’s regime 
mandated the use of discursive and non-discursive symbols to 
avoid the direct criticism that produced imprisonment or 
disappearance of regime enemies.  (2) Opponents of the regime 
could interpret religious and secular history to influence the beliefs 
and actions of the citizenry.  And (3) a preexisting religious ritual 
was available for reinterpretation to change its communal 
meaning. 
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Based largely on Shi’ite conceptions of authority, legitimacy, and 
obligation, Khomeini’s revolution of 1979 shaped itself to popular 
images of leadership and used the rhetorical apparatus available 
such leaders.  As the only viable alternative to the Shah, Khomeini 
could invoke a strict and doctrinal conception of fard that 
grounded personal obligations in traditions of Shi’ite Islam.  Once 
Khomeini framed the revolutionary confrontation as an issue of 
Islamic identity, centered on embracing indigenous culture and 
condemning Western imperialism, he had delegitimated the Shah 
and potentially competing opponents.  Islamic tradition was the 
domain for Khomeini’s rhetorical invention.  Using the topoi of 
this tradition, he stressed the symbolic, mythical, and ritualistic 
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dimensions of Shi’ism. 
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Khomeini’s radical reinterpretations of some elements of Shi’ite 
theology fortified his power.  His ethos of mysticism conferred a 
sacred status through charismatic qualities that could oblige his 
followers in ways unavailable to other Ayatollahs.  Combined with 
his charisma, the use of fard enabled Khomeini to attract the lion’s 
share of followers, which his rhetoric helped shape into a devoted, 
potent movement. 
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Ultimately it was Khomeini’s rhetorical victory that opened the 
religious and political doors for legal implementation of his Islamic 
form of government.  As the religious and political head of the 
government, Khomeini could define scriptural forms of obligation 
for all citizens of Iran, not just the faithful.  Khomeini’s theology 
fed his rhetorical crusade by enhancing his authority, but his 
discourse transformed theological argument into constitutional 
law. 
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Iran still organizes itself according to the Khomeini’s dictates, and 
Velayat-e Faqih is required reading for Iran’s fifteen million 
school children (Arjomand 1980).  The impact of pan-Islamic 
versions of his discourse is notable throughout the Middle East.  
Many of Tehran’s current strategies stem from Khomeini’s 
revolutionary devices (Ibrahim 1992, p. 2). To a world in the wake 
of 9/11, the Iranian Revolution and the hostage crisis of 1979 
remain strong symbols of a clash of cultures that shadows in the 
possibility of Islamic revolutions elsewhere. 
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Despite the discourse of al Qaeda and other radical Islamists, 
however, the revolutionary pendulum in Iran appears to be 
swinging in an opposite direction.  The student protests in 1999 
and again in 2003 portend an ending or at least a softening of 
Khomeini’s Islamic Revolution.  Students who were not yet born 
during Khomeini’s revolution protest the political, religious, and 
personal oppressions in Iran.  Their criticisms seem ironically 
similar to dissent from the Shah’s regime a quarter-century 
before.  How these events might continue, how the recent war in 
Iraq might affect its neighbor, and how worries about nuclear 
weapons in Iran might influence grass-roots attitudes toward the 
current religious and political leadership remain to be seen.  In 
many respects, though, the rhetoric of the Iranian Revolution and 
Khomeini’s discourse of Islamic radicalism seem likely to remain 
dynamics important for the region and the world. 
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 Notes  
 
 
 
1      This analysis serves a different goal from the one addressed by 
Heisey and Trebing.  In their analysis, they compared the 
“rhetorical visions” presented to the Iranian people by both the 
Shah and Khomeini.  This work concentrates on the theological 
and ideological grounding of Khomeini’s discourse and the impact 
it had on creating what has become an enduring Islamic identity. 
 
 
 
 
2     Many revolutionary pamphlets used this title.  Included are:  
Imam Khomeini’s Message (Iran: n.p., 1981); Imam Khomeini's 
Message for April 1st (Iran: n.p. April 1981); Imam Khomeini’s 
Message for Black Friday (Iran: n.p., 1981); Imam Khomeini:  The 
Revolutionary Line of Action (Iran: n.p., n.d.); Islamic Weekly 
Bulletin (Iran: n.p., 1981). 
 
 
 
 
3     Members of the Islamic Presentation Committee, discussion 
with author on the Western misinterpretation of Jihad, Safat, 
Kuwait, March, 1996.  
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